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ABSTRACT 
 
While much of the literature on descriptive representation of women focuses on the formal role played by 
political parties and institutions, a growing body of research emphasizes the impact of informal institu-
tions. We build on this scholarship and hypothesize that, as corruption and partiality in government favor 
clientelism and advancement of candidates with access to traditional networks, this will have a negative 
impact on the proportion of elected women. We test this argument on a new, as yet unused dataset on 
locally elected councilors in 167 regions of 18 European countries. Using a novel measure of regional 
corruption and quality of government, we perform a multi-level analysis with several regional-level as well 
as national-level control variables. As such, this article is one of the first to study the variance of women’s 
local political representation within countries in a comparative perspective. The results suggest that levels 
of corruption, partiality, and ineffectiveness of government substantially affect the proportion of female 
councilors. The article contributes by illustrating how bad governance is an important determinant for 
women’s political presence in contemporary Europe and concludes that hindrances to female representa-
tion are not eliminated by the reformation of formal/organizational factors alone. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
Parties are becoming the key variable in research on women’s political representation, especially in re-
search focusing on Europe. Gallagher and Marsh (1988) have aptly described parties’ candidate selection 
procedures as “the secret garden of politics,” but feminist scholars have succeeded in shedding light on 
organizational factors such as the presence of party gender quotas (Dahlerup 2006; Krook 2009; Paxton et 
al. 2010; Tripp and Kang 2008). Research has also highlighted how aspects such as centralization and for-
malization affect the recruitment of women. One convincing finding is that, for the advancement of 
women, it is important that the party organization has ties with organizations outside the party because 
these provide more points of access for women (Kittilson 2006, 48-49). 
 
There is little doubt that parties, and how they organize, are decisive for the advancement of women. A 
burgeoning field of research, however, has started to complement previous literature by looking at infor-
mal influences in the selection of female political candidates. In a recent study, Fox and Lawless (2010) 
point to an “ingrained ethos of masculinity” in political parties; they found that highly qualified and politi-
cally well-connected women from both major political parties in the United States are less likely than simi-
larly situated men to be recruited to run for public office. Cheng and Tavits (2011) discuss three mecha-
nisms at work in informal dynamics: (i) gatekeepers are more likely to recruit and promote people like 
themselves, (ii) there is a lack of women in male party gatekeepers’ social networks, and (iii) there is an 
indirect signal effect – if most of the gatekeepers at the national or local level are men, this signals that 
there is an “old boys’ club at work,” which discourages women’s participation. 
 
Our study should be seen as part of the burgeoning field of research focusing on informal influences in 
the selection of female political candidates. We highlight a previously overlooked factor, namely, the role 
of corruption and bad governance. Our research draws on insights gained from studies focusing mostly 
on countries outside Europe. For example, cross-national comparative research has established that socie-
ties that elect few women tend to be more corrupt than societies that elect large numbers of women (Dol-
lar et al. 2001; Swamy et. al. 2001). In a case-study on Thailand, Bjarnegård (2013) demonstrates how in-
formal recruitment to political positions serves to protect corrupt interactions between men in power, and 
 she argues that women are excluded since they are not trusted with the sensitive nature of exchanges. We 
believe that much could be gained by taking this research into account in studies on women’s political 
representation in Europe. Recent studies show that corruption and bad governance are more widespread 
and vary within countries in Europe to a larger degree than previously recognized (Charron et al. 2011). At 
the same time, while research holds that the proportion of women remains low in a number of political 
institutions throughout Europe, few comparative studies have analyzed the variance in women’s represen-
tation beyond national-level institutions. 
 
This study breaks new ground by focusing on the subnational level in Europe. We suggest that when cor-
ruption and bad governance are widespread, informal influence is strong, favoring clientelism and ad-
vancement of candidates with access to traditional networks. More specifically, we hypothesize that a low 
quality of government – understood in terms of levels of corruption, partiality, and ineffectiveness of 
government services (Rothstein and Teorell 2008) – has a negative impact on the proportion of elected 
women. With new, as yet unused data on women’s local representation, we can empirically test this claim. 
We have constructed a comprehensive dataset on the proportion of locally elected female councilors in 
167 NUTS (Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics) regions in 18 European countries in the most 
recent elections for which data was available. Using a novel measure of regional governance, the European 
Quality of Government Index (Charron et al. 2011), we perform a hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) 
analysis with regional-level control variables such as educational attainment and economic development, 
as well as the national-level controls of gender quotas, gender equality culture, and types of electoral sys-
tem. In this respect, this article contributes a unique analysis of the variance of women’s local political 
representation within countries in a comparative perspective. Our findings underpin the notion that quali-
ty of government is the new “secret garden of politics,” which needs to be mapped out in greater detail. 
The results show that levels of corruption and partiality of government substantially affect the proportion 
of female local councilors and hence are important determinants of women’s political representation in 
contemporary Europe.  
 
 The rest of the article will proceed as follows: First we discuss recent trends in research on women’s polit-
ical representation and make a distinction between descriptive versus substantive representation of wom-
en. Thereafter we review findings in current scholarship on gender and corruption and show how this 
strand of research is relevant for understanding women’s inclusion in/exclusion from political institutions. 
In the section on methodology we argue for the advantage of studying the subnational level in Europe, 
and we present our new dataset on locally elected councilors. The section on results reports the findings 
from our empirical analysis. In the concluding section we argue that hindrances to women’s political rep-
resentation are not eliminated by the reformation of formal/organizational factors alone. 
 
DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN 
A much-used distinction in scholarship on politics and gender is that between descriptive and substantive 
representation of women. The first strand of research, descriptive representation, focuses on variations in 
the number of women elected to political institutions, primarily parliaments, across time and in different 
parts of the world. The second strand of research, substantive representation, focuses on effects of wom-
en’s presence in political institutions. In this article we focus explicitly on descriptive representation. While 
this research field has a long tradition (cf. Duverger 1955), there is no consensus among scholars about 
whether formal or informal factors play a larger role in causing variations in the numbers of women elect-
ed.   
 
The sizeable literature on causes behind the election of large numbers of women reveals a shift, at least in 
Western democracies, from system-oriented towards strategy-oriented explanatory models (Wängnerud 
2009). Strategy-oriented explanatory models dig into processes that are endogenous to parties; factors 
such as party ideology and organizational structure are brought forward. In contrast, system-oriented ex-
planatory models dig into processes that are exogenous to parties; factors such as the electoral system and 
gender equality culture are brought forward. Studies on informal influence can be situated somewhere in 
between: they aim to highlight complex dynamics at work outside “the protocol.” There are variations, 
especially within countries, that cannot be explained by party ideology or organizational factors alone. 
Figures from the dataset used in this article can illustrate. For example, how is it that, in Greece, there are 
 some regions in which females make up an average of 12 per cent of local councilors, whereas in other 
regions females make up more than 24 per cent of councilors? Italy is another country with large varia-
tions at the subnational level; there are some regions with an average of 10 per cent female local counci-
lors and others with an average of 28 per cent.  
 
Our suggestion is, as already stated, that much could be gained by taking findings in research on gender 
and corruption into account when trying to explain variations in women’s descriptive representation in 
Europe. We build, for example, on research by Esaray and Chirillo (2012) analyzing the relationship be-
tween gender and attitudes towards bribery among citizens, as well as the association between female par-
ticipation in parliaments and national levels of corruption. Most important, they find a stronger relation-
ship between gender and corruption in democracies than in autocratic systems. 
 
RESEARCH ON GENDER AND CORRUPTION 
Previous research on the relationship between gender and corruption has focused mainly on individual 
differences in tolerance to corruption and the relationship between national shares of  female politicians 
and corresponding degrees of  corruption. In our focus on the descriptive representation of  women we 
deal primarily with the latter scholarship. 
 
In their seminal study, Dollar et al. (2001) demonstrate that higher rates of  female participation in 
government are associated with lower national levels of  corruption. They measure corruption using data 
from the International Country Risk Guide and claim to have included a range of  variables in their 
analysis to control for various underlying institutional characteristics that could be responsible for a 
spurious correlation. Since then, the association between the presence of  women and levels of  corruption 
has been reproduced in many ways (e.g. Treisman 2007). Studying national differences in the Corruption 
Perception Index, Swamy et al. (2001) also propose that countries with a greater representation of  women 
have lower levels of  corruption. This has in turn produced an underlying assumption among a number of  
policy-makers that increasing the presence of  women can be a quick fix in reducing corruption (e.g. World 
Bank 2001).  
  
In contrast, Sung (2003) launched a rival explanation, the “fairer system” thesis. This argument contends 
that “liberal democratic institutions and spirit increase female participation in government and restrain 
systemic corruption, but the latter two factors are not causally related” (Sung 2003, 708). Data from 
Freedom House and Fraser Institute is used to back up the theoretical argument in the article. According 
to Sung (2003, 718), the effect of  female participation is lost when liberal constitutionalism is controlled 
for, as both gender equality and low corruption are seen as effects of  a fair system. These findings were 
later tested and largely supported, also with new indicators used as a proxy for gender inequality (Branisa 
and Ziegler 2010). While Vijayalakshmi (2008) finds no effect on corruption from having a larger share of  
female politicians in the local self-government of  India, a different result is reported by Beaman et al. 
(2011). In this experimental study, the authors investigate the effect of  a scheme of  randomized quotas of  
reserved seats for women in local village assemblies in India. Accordingly, the villages that had a female 
leader as a result of  this randomized scheme report fewer instances of  bribery. It is noted by Pande and 
Ford (2012, 20) that, regarding the results from this study, “it is possible that inexperience rather than 
preferences limits corruption on the part of  women.” In a recent study Sung (2012) analyzes the impact 
of  having a large number – or a large increase in the number – of  elected women in the legislative 
parliament on national levels of  corruption. Using data over time and across most democracies, the panel 
study finds no effect on corruption from either high numbers of  elected women nor from increases in the 
numbers of  elected women.  
 
Acknowledging that the relationship between the representation of  women and corruption is contested 
and possibly more complex than simply an effect of  one variable in one direction on another variable, our 
focus in this article is more limited. We are interested in examining the extent to which levels of  
corruption and bad governance can explain the variations in the share of  elected women at the local level 
in Europe. Working within this delimitation, we draw on theoretical work by scholars exploring why 
corruption can be believed to affect the processes of  recruitment to political positions. 
 
 Closely knit networks – the mechanism excluding women in corrupt contexts 
Bjarnegård (2013) contends that certain aspects of  clientelism affect the political representation of  
women. Criticizing assumptions in earlier research that has viewed women in elected seats as an antidote 
for corruption, she argues that the association that has been identified in previous writings is in fact 
misguided and that these studies “tap into something larger than corruption, namely clientelism and 
change over time” (Bjarnegård 2013, 53). She argues that clientelism as a political practice highlights the 
interplay between formal and informal political institutions. When formal institutions are weak, certain 
types of  informal institutions may grow strong. According to Bjarnegård, the gender dimension kicks in 
since “in clientelist systems, opportunities for electoral corruption are gendered in that only those with 
access to networks, those with connections within the local or national elite, those with resources to 
finance corrupt behavior, and those who are already influential in society are in positions to be considered 
assets in clientelist networks and are the only ones who will be trusted with the sensitive nature of  the 
exchange” (Bjarnegård 2013, 37).  
 
Clientelism is a label for exchanges of  personal favors for political support. In contrast to Bjarnegård, we 
believe that these factors may be at play in comparatively formalized systems as well, hence it would be 
more correct to theorize on the role of  informal influence, as in the study by Cheng and Tavits (2011). 
Cheng and Tavits investigate whether the gatekeeper – the local party president – is a woman or a man. 
The finding is that women candidates are more likely to be nominated when the gatekeeper is a woman. 
As previously discussed, they suggest both direct and indirect effects: direct effects stem from the fact that 
gatekeepers are more likely to recruit and promote people like themselves and that female party 
gatekeepers have more women in their social networks. Indirect effects stem from signals of  an “old boys’ 
club at work.” We find the distinction between direct and indirect effects useful. There is some evidence 
that female candidates, in corrupt systems, lack the economic resources needed to buy support – a direct 
effect. However, in a European context it may be more useful to think in terms of  closely knit networks 
where outsiders – women – are not trusted and thus locked out. Corruption, partiality, and ineffectiveness 
of  government services could be likened to a filter hindering women, and it is reasonable to believe that 
there are two mechanisms at work at one and the same time: in corrupt systems, party gatekeepers are less 
 willing to support women candidates, and politically engaged women are also less willing to strive for 
candidacy. 
 
We have argued that male-dominated closely knit networks with informal patterns of  recruitment can 
hinder the advancement of  women in political institutions in European countries. i  Following this 
reasoning, our intention is to test this claim empirically. We therefore hypothesize that a low quality of  
government – understood as high levels of  corruption, partiality, and ineffectiveness of  government 
services – will have a negative impact on the proportion of  female local councilors in the European 
regions. 
 
DESIGN AND DATA 
In this study we break new ground by focusing on the gender composition of elected officials at the sub-
national level and by studying regions rather than nations. Our study was prompted by the recent publica-
tion of other studies showing that corruption and bad governance are more widespread and vary to a larg-
er extent within countries in Europe than previously recognized (Charron et al. 2011). While the propor-
tion of women is still low in a number of political institutions throughout Europe, few comparative stud-
ies have analyzed the variance in descriptive representation beyond national-level institutions. This insight 
informed our collection of data on the proportion of female local councilors in the European regions. 
Even though European countries are heterogeneous, they are, from a global perspective, quite similar in 
terms of culture, modernization, and liberal democratic institutions. Much research in the field of gender 
and corruption is focused on regions like Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Yet, we argue that it is essential 
to recognize that a low quality of government has a negative effect on social and economic development 
in established democracies as well. This leads us to a research design with several opportunities. Most 
important, our focus on regions allows us to move beyond the ecological fallacies sometimes present in 
cross-country studies, where researchers ignore variances within countries and make inferences regarding 
nations based on observations that are not valid for the entire country (Rydgren 2007).  
 
 Explaining female local councilors in the European regions 
The dependent variable of our study is the proportion of locally elected female councilors aggregated to a 
mean of each region. Since the construction of this variable required a comprehensive collection of new 
data by the authors, the following sections will briefly describe the data collection procedure. It should be 
noted that previous scholarly comparisons of subnational representation of elected women have provided 
little insight into the reasons for the variations across and within countries.ii At best, a report has provided 
an overview of the national averages of locally elected women (CEMR 2008). Yet no recent source of 
comparative data exists to date that describes such variances within countries. The dataset used in this 
article therefore contributes by providing a unique picture of the proportion of women in the locally elect-
ed assemblies in the European regions.  
 
The authors performed the collection of data in the 18 countries included in this study with the purpose 
of finding the most recent figures (as of March 2013) on the gender composition of locally elected coun-
cils. The first priority was to obtain the official sources of data from statistical offices and electoral institu-
tions. In some instances – when statistics from official channels were not sufficiently comprehensive – 
experts, such as scholars specialized in elections or statistics, provided the figures (for a description of 
sources, see Appendix 2).  
 
What constitutes a local councilor is difficult to assess across these diverse institutional settings. For 16 of 
the 18 countries studied in this report we have found figures on categories that we believe are highly com-
parable: They broadly correspond to municipal councils – that is, local deliberative assemblies constituted 
by councilors elected by direct universal suffrage. Two countries (Slovakia and Romania) presented some 
challenges in meeting these requirements. For Romania, data on municipal councilors is not available to 
researchers, and so we use figures on their intermediate-level councils. In Slovakia, national authorities 
have not collected data on the gender composition of local councilors. Instead of excluding the country 
from this comparison we include figures on the sex ratio of mayors of the municipalities in the country 
(for more information on the local assemblies in the countries, see Table 1).iii The regions in this study are 
based on the system of NUTS (Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics) and their levels differ in 
 the countries we analyze. Figures on local councilors in each municipality or local division are aggregated 
to an average value for each NUTS region in this study.iv This is a common procedure of reporting statis-
tics in many of these countries, and most often the authors have not been forced to make this calculation, 
but have instead relied on official aggregates. 
 
Overall, we believe that our dependent variable is operationalized in a way that we measure the concept 
that we are interested in. The percentage of elected women is a standard operationalization in the literature 
on descriptive representation (Wängnerud 2009). It should be acknowledged that it is challenging to com-
pare local councilors across these institutionally diverse contexts, as the mandates and responsibilities of 
these councilors differ across countries. The authors have compiled the responsibilities of the local coun-
cils of each country and found that the responsibilities of the local councils differ across the 18 countries 
we study (this information is readily available upon request). However, we do not see this as problematic 
since we are not aiming to explain the effects of having a certain share of locally elected women. Assum-
ing that the processes of clientelism and recruitment to the position of councilor are relatively similar, 
even though these councils might have different responsibilities, we believe that the specific differences 
between the countries are less relevant. Also, it should be noted that if countries do indeed differ signifi-
cantly with respect to how corruption affects the share of elected women, these differences are taken into 
account statistically by the random intercept at the country level in our multi-level model.  
 
Since the electoral cycles in the countries we study are not synchronized, the year when the most recent 
elections were held varies across our sample from 2008 to 2012 (see Table 1 for details). In three coun-
tries, Portugal, Netherlands, and Denmark (and also in a few Austrian regions), elections were held in 
2009. The French data is from 2008. Since the data on regional quality of government was collected dur-
ing 2009 and we would like the dependent variable to be measured after our main independent one, this is 
not perfect. However, we argue that this does not constitute a problem. Quality of government is known 
to be a “sticky” concept and it is unlikely that this measure would fluctuate rapidly over time.  
  
 TABLE 1  COMPARING LOCAL COUNCILORS ACROSS 18 COUNTRIES 
Country Name of local councils No. local au-
thorities 
Year of 
election 
France Municipal councils (conseil municipal) 36 569 2008 
Germany Local council (gemeinderat)           app 14000 2011 
Italy Local council (consiglio comunale) 8094 2011 
Spain Local council (concejal) 8117 2011 
UK Local authority councils 466 2010 
Hungary Municipal body of representatives (képviselõ-testület) 3175 2010 
Czech Republic Municipal council (zastupitelstvo obce) 6250 2010 
Slovakia Local council (obecné zastupiteľstvo in municipalities, mestské zastupiteľstvo in 
cities). Figures refer to mayors (starosta in municipalities, primátor in cities). 
                 2792 
    (2009 mayors) 
             2010 
 
Portugal Parish assembly (assembleia de freguesia) 4259 2009 
Romania County council (consiliul judeţean) 41  2012 
Sweden Municipal assembly (kommunfullmäktige) 290 2010 
Denmark Municipal council (kommunalbestyrelse) 98 2009 
Belgium Municipal council (conseil communal/ gemeenteraad ) 589 2012 
Austria Municipal council (gemeinderat) 2357 2009-12 
Netherlands Local council (gemeenteraad) 418 2009 
Poland Municipal council (rada gminy) 2479 2010 
Bulgaria Municipal council (obchtinski savet) 264 2010 
Greece Municipal council (dimotiko simvoulio) 325 2010 
 
 
             
 FIGURE 1 LOCALLY ELECTED FEMALE COUNCILORS IN THE EUROPEAN REGIONS (PERCENT)  
 
 Comments: For the exact share of elected women for each region, see the Appendix 3. 
 
Studying the distribution of our dependent variable we can conclude that there is a large variance in the 
share of locally elected women between countries, but more importantly, also within the nations in this 
study. The difference between the regions with the lowest and the highest share of women exceeds 10 per 
cent in a majority of the countries in our sample. In Denmark, for example, the region of Syddanmark has 
an average of 28.5 per cent women in their local assemblies, compared to 38.6 per cent in Hovedstaden. 
In Greece, the 12.3 per cent female share of the councilors in the region of Kentriki Ellada stands in con-
trast to the region of Attica and its mean proportion of 24.3 per cent. In Italy, too, this difference is clearly 
visible. While the councils in Emilia-Romagna comprise 28.2 per cent women on average, those in the 
 region of Campania are made up of only 10 per cent women. The variance in the share of locally elected 
female councilors is graphically illustrated in Figure 1 and listed numerically in Appendix 3. 
 
Regional measure of Quality of Government 
While there is no shortage of indicators for levels of corruption or the quality of government in countries 
(e.g. the International Country Risk Guide rating, the Corruptions Perception Index, and the World Bank 
Good Governance Indicator), there is a clear lack of reliable data on the subnational level. We use the 
most comprehensive regional governance indicator available, the European Quality of Government Index 
(EQI). This index was assembled in 2009 by scholars at the Quality of Government Institute, at the Uni-
versity of Gothenburg, with funding from the European Commission (see Charron et al. 2011). The inves-
tigators focused on 18 countries and surveyed approximately 34 000 citizens on three different types of 
government services (law enforcement, health care, and education). Participants were asked to numerically 
evaluate three aspects of these services: their quality, impartiality and corruption. The survey consisted of 16 
independent questions related to the three pillars of good governance, which were then combined to cre-
ate a regional index. Moreover, the researchers combined the regional scores with external measures of 
quality of government in order to complement the regional scores from the survey with a country context. 
To do so, the researchers introduced a component controlling for these regions’ deviation from the na-
tional average of the established World Bank’s World Government Indicator (WGI).v The final index is 
standardized so that the mean is 0 with a standard deviation of 1. In all, the EQI gauges the quality, impar-
tiality, and corruption of government in these regions. Higher numbers correspond with low levels of 
corruption, partiality, and ineffectiveness, and lower numbers correspond with high levels of these factors 
(see also Charron and Lapuente 2013). We include all regions from the 18 countries that have been cov-
ered by the EQI.vi 
 
National-level control variables 
Our model includes a rigorous test for alternative explanations for the variance of our dependent variable. 
We use both national-level and regional-level variables for this purpose. The four national-level controls 
are type of election system, gender equality culture, legislative gender quota at the subnational level, and voluntary party 
 gender quotas. The role of election systems has a long history of research on women’s representation (e.g. 
Duverger 1955; Norris 1993). Numerous studies find that women’s presence is favored by electoral sys-
tems with party lists, proportional representation (PR), and large district magnitudes (see Kittilson 2006). 
To account for this aspect we control for election system and create four dummy variables (Mixed-
Member Proportional system, Two-Round System, Party-List Proportional System, and First Past the Post 
system).vii Related to the control for gender equality culture, it has been stated that “societies that elect 
large numbers of women tend to be more gender equal also in other respects than societies that elect few 
women” (Wängnerud 2009, 51). The concept of gender equality culture – where women have opportuni-
ties for upward mobility – has been widely acknowledged to correlate with the number of women in elect-
ed seats (Inglehart and Norris 2003, 138). Although the concept is quite difficult to gauge empirically, a 
reasonable alternative is to use a measure of women’s participation in the labor force (Iversen and Rosen-
bluth 2008; Stockemer 2011). This measure has been shown to be significant in previous analyses of 
women’s participation in local politics, comparing national averages in Europe, thus it makes sense to 
include this factor as a control (Wide 2006, 144). The indicator included in our analysis measures the ratio 
of women to men active in the labor market.viii It has been shown that, especially in more recent democra-
cies, legislative quotas matters (Dahlerup 2006). To gauge this effect we have created dummy variables for 
countries with legislative gender quotas at the subnational level.ix Besides the importance of legislative acts, 
some studies also point to voluntary acts by parties, such as the implementation of gender quotas or other 
voluntary gender-specific measures within parties, as important determinants of the number of women 
elected (Freidenvall 2006; Studlar and McAllister 2002). It should be noted that the number of women 
elected has also increased in parties that have never adopted quotas. Thus, one can expect a “contagion 
effect” in party systems where one party has adopted voluntary quotas (such as a zipper system for party 
lists); that is a positive impact on the share of female candidates also in other parties (Kittilson 2006). To 
measure this effect we introduce dummy variables for countries with political parties that have adopted 
voluntary gender quotas.x  
 
 Regional-level control variables 
Numerous studies have found that modernization in a broad sense often tends to correlate with high gen-
der equality and a high presence of elected women (Berg 2007; Ingelhart and Norris 2003). It has been 
found that countries with higher economic development and a highly educated population tend to elect a 
larger share of women. To account for these effects, regional measures of GDP per capita and level of educa-
tion are included as regional indicators of modernization.xi The measure for GDP per capita has been aver-
aged for the years 2007-2009 and, as this is the standard procedure when dealing with skewed variables, 
logarithmically transformed. The indicator for education is a measure of the percentage of the population 
having completed a tertiary education. 
 
Potential endogeneity 
Before we report the findings from our empirical test, a discussion on the possible challenge of endogene-
ity between the share of locally elected women and regional quality of government is warranted. With the 
debate on the causal relationship between gender and corruption in mind, one could believe that the pro-
portion of women in local parliaments would affect the governance in these regions. In order to address 
this potential problem in our analysis we would, ideally, need time-series data on both women’s represen-
tation and regional governance. As this data does not exist, we have tried our best to measure our depend-
ent variable after the data on governance. We are therefore humble with our claims and do not attempt to 
end any debate on causality between gender and corruption. However, we still believe that providing a 
robust result of correlation in this cross-regional sample is a substantial contribution in itself. We also 
argue that we do not have a potential problem of spurious relationships in our model. Sung (2003) pro-
poses that the correlation between corruption and women’s representation across nations is produced by 
liberal democracy. It should be noted that we, in this study, analyze only democratic countries (all coun-
tries in the sample are declared “free” in the Freedom House Index and are classified as “democracies” in 
the Polity IV scorexii). As we hold the democracy variable relatively constant across the countries we study, 
this factor should not significantly influence our dependent variable. 
 
 METHOD 
To gauge the effect of corruption and quality of government on our dependent variable we firstly analyze 
the bivariate relationship between the proportion of elected women and regional quality of government. 
Secondly, we proceed to build a multi-level model. We have two regional-level covariates (GDP per capita 
and educational attainment) and four national-level factors (the electoral system type, female labor force 
participation, legislative gender quotas on the subnational level and voluntary party quotas). Having data 
structured across two different geographical stages we deem hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) to be the 
appropriate method (Goldstein 2010). In our multi-level model 167 European regions are nested within 
18 countries.  
 
As discussed recently by Stegmueller  (2013), studies in comparative political research often face the prob-
lem of analyzing a small numbers of countries using multi-level analysis. The recommendations from the 
literature on what is the minimum number of countries for this method have also varied quite widely (see 
Hox et al. 2012). Since we do not model cross-level interactions in our analysis we believe that we limit the 
relative bias of effect estimates of the macro level variables on level one observations and hence regard 
our method appropriate. We have also run a model using OLS-regression with robust standard errors 
clustered around countries and find similar results as reported below regarding the impact of the quality of 
government variable (available from the authors upon request). 
 
For summary statistics of the variables included in the model, see Appendix 1. It should be noted that the 
dependent variable we analyze below is the one where we included 18 countries, and thus also the two 
countries (Slovakia and Romania) that admittedly are a bit differently measured. Our rationale for this is 
based on thorough analysis and several tests to ensure that these two countries do not significantly alter 
our results. We have run the same model using a slightly altered dependent variable (having only one of 
these countries or none of them) and basically find the same results as reported below. This further 
strengthens our belief that the same process of corruption and partiality that affects the recruitment of 
women is present in both county councils and municipal councils. The literature on women’s representa-
tion sometimes notes that the Nordic countries are difficult to compare with other settings (Rosenbluth et 
 al. 2006). We see no problem with including the regions of Denmark and Sweden in this analysis. Consti-
tuting 5 per cent of our sample they do not drive our results to any significant extent.  
 
RESULTS 
From the scatter plot in Figure 2 it is evident that we have a strong bivariate relationship between regional 
quality of government and the average proportion of locally elected women in these entities. This relation-
ship is positive and based on this first analysis it is apparent that the regions with less partiality, corruption 
and ineffectiveness tend to be the ones with a higher share of female councilors. Within some countries 
this can be seen clearly. In Greece and Italy, for instance, we generally find that the regions with the worst 
EQI score are the ones with the lowest presence of women. Sweden, on the other hand, shows little varia-
tion in either of the two main variables across regions, but shows that low levels of corruption and partial-
ity within government and a high presence of locally elected women correlate. However, in order to com-
plement this picture with even more robust results we proceed to report findings from the multivariate 
model. 
FIGURE 2. BIVARIATE RELATIONSHIP: FEMALE COUNCILORS AND QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT 
 
 
 
 TABLE 2. RESULTS FROM THE MULTIVARIATE HLM ANALYSIS 
Dependent variable: Share of female councilors 
Fixed Intercept 
27.454*** 
(1.181) 
27.441*** 
(1.515) 
-28.142 
(41.376) 
-18.221 
(50.382) 
EQI  
3.284*** 
(0.693) 
 2.659*** 
(0.737) 
 2.463*** 
(0.733) 
Education   
0.020 
(0.083) 
0.024 
(0.095) 
log GDP/c    
    4.347*** 
(1.572) 
  5.379*** 
(1.616) 
Party quota   
-4.265 
(5.621) 
-5.943 
(6.983) 
Subnational legislative quota   2.574 (6.148) 0.025 (7.505) 
List PR election system   
0.995 
(8.212) 
1.432 
(10.499) 
TRS election system   
-3.701 
(12.610) 
4.049 
(15.693) 
MMP election system   
2.177 
(8.903) 
2.133 
(11.262) 
Fem labor force participation   
17.271 
(47.366) 
-5.411 
(57.796) 
Random intercept 7.528 (1.365) 6.223 (1.153) 
 7.456  
(1.759) 8.758 (3.787) 
Model for log GDP/c slope    
0.000 
(0.000) 
Model for education slope    
0.149 
(0.167) 
Log likelihood -502.1402   -491.3139    -465.2003  -465.028    
AIC 1010.28 990.6278   954.4006 958.056   
BIC 1019.634 1003.1 991.8165 1001.708 
Observations 167 167 167 167 
Number of countries 18 18 18 18 
Comments: The three dummy variables for election system have the fourth dummy, for countries with a First Past The Post-election sys-
tem, as a reference category. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *** = p<0.001, ** = p<0.01, * = p<0.05. 
 
 
Our multivariate HLM analysis basically confirms the findings that regional quality of government has a 
substantially strong effect on women’s representation in the European regions. As evident in model 2 of 
Table 3, when only the effect from EQI is reported, this relationship is positive and significant at the 99.9 
per cent level. When our regional-level and national-level control variables are introduced this effect is 
slightly decreased, but still strong. In our full analysis, model 4 of Table 3, we still observe positive and 
significant coefficients from EQI on our dependent variable, when all our independent variables are taken 
into account. More specifically, the size of the coefficient indicate that a one-point increase in regional 
governance would predict an increase of approximately 2.5 higher percent of female councilors on aver-
 age. Taking our country-level variations into account, we can also see that our model explains a large share 
of the variance within countries. 
 
The statistics reported in Table 3 indicate that our full model indeed has a good fit and explains a substan-
tial part of the variance in the proportion of locally elected women in the European regions. The control 
variables show surprisingly few significant effects, but most of them have the anticipated sign of direction. 
GDP per capita have a positive and significant effect. Also, it should be noted that the findings remain 
robust if we exclude the Romanian and Slovakian regions from this analysis.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The empirical analysis performed in this article substantiates the suggestion that corruption, partiality, and 
ineffectiveness of government services are important factors when investigating the variance in the repre-
sentation of women. In this study we have analyzed a novel dataset on the proportion of locally elected 
female councilors in Europe. As such, this article is one of the first to study the variance of women’s local 
political representation within countries in a comparative perspective. Our findings suggest that regional 
figures on governance quality exert a substantial influence on women’s local political representation.  
 
In our empirical test we rely on cross-sectional data and therefore need to remain careful when making 
inferences. On the one hand, some studies (e.g. Wängnerud and Grimes 2012) have suggested that there 
might be feedback mechanisms related to national levels of corruption where there are higher proportions 
of female politicians – thus we might have potential challenges of endogeneity in our model. One the 
other hand, we believe that there are three reasons that this does not constitute a large problem. Firstly, 
we basically measure our dependent variable after our main independent ones. Secondly, we rest on the 
empirical results where it is mainly cross-country studies that have argued that having a large share of 
elected women has an effect on corruption (Dollar et al. 2001; Swamy et al. 2001). The studies using a 
time-series design fail to find any significant effects (Sung 2012). Thirdly, we believe that there are even 
fewer theoretical reasons to suppose that politicians elected at the local level would have enough influence 
to fundamentally eradicate corruption and partiality in government.  
  
We contribute in two respects to the theoretical discussion on gender and politics. Firstly, we argue that, 
as factors such as corruption and bad governance affect the proportion of elected women, hindrances to 
women’s political representation are not eliminated by the reformation of formal/organizational factors 
alone. Hopefully, this will inform the future discussion on gender and representation. Secondly, we specif-
ically contribute to the debate on gender and corruption. Sung (2003, 718) observes that “gender equality 
and government accountability are both great achievements of modern liberal democracy” and thus 
downplays the possible effect of corruption on women’s representation. In earlier literature on country 
comparisons, such reasoning is difficult to question. However, studying female descriptive representation 
at the regional level, we can move beyond the prior focus on national-level institutions. If Sung was right, 
then we should not observe such a wide variance of elected women within the regions in the (democratic) 
countries we study. Controlling for regional-level and national-level factors that can be seen as possible 
determinants of women’s representation, our models still indicate a significant and substantially important 
impact from our regional measure of quality of government.   
 
Although we do not claim to propose a final answer to the debate of causality between the representation 
of women and levels of corruption, our findings clearly advance this field of research. For future empirical 
research it would be worthwhile to study how this relationship holds in a time-series analysis at the subna-
tional level. This would of course require a continuous effort, as regional data on governance and wom-
en’s local representation currently is limited. The test performed in this article constitutes for now a signif-
icant contribution, and we urge other scholars to continue this discussion.  Finally, we would like go back 
to the study by Cheng and Tavits (2011) demonstrating that women candidates are more likely to be nom-
inated when the gatekeeper is a woman. It would be relevant to study whether the presence of female 
gatekeepers is a proxy for a “clean” system or whether it is possible to separate the effects of each factor.  
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 APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1.  Summary statistics for the variables in the model 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Share 167 27.60246 8.252306 10.04  44.5565 
EQI 167   -0.0011182   1.016937 -2.87937   1.74988 
Gdp 167 9.853323 0.6516282 7.953688  11.00957 
Edu 167 22.39371 8.044362  7.6  42.9 
fem_lab 167 0.7588922 0.0621198 0.634   0.875 
Listpr 167 0.6347305   0.4829538 0 1 
Trs 167 0.1317365 0.3392213 0 1 
Mmp 167 0.1616766   0.3692612   0 1 
Fptp 167 0.0718563   0.2590265  0 1 
quota_subnat 167 0.5329341  0.5004147 0 1 
quota_party 167 0.7784431   0.4165434 0 1 
 
  
 Appendix 2.  Sources from which data was collected 
Country Sources 
France Dr. Aurelia Troupel, Faculté de Droit et de Science Politique 
Germany Statistisches Bundesamt, Statistischer Informationsservice and Landesbetrieb für Statistik und 
Kommunikationstechnologie Niedersachsen 
Italy The Ministry of Interior 
Spain The Ministry of Interior 
UK The UK Local Government Association, the Welsch Local Government Association, the Con-
vention of Scottish Local Authorities, the Local Government Staff Commission in Belfast 
Hungary The Election Information Service at the National Election Office of Hungary 
Czech 
Republic 
The Information Services Unit of the Headquarters of the Czech Statistical Office 
Slovakia The International Relations Department, Association of Towns and Communities of Slovakia 
Portugal The Directorate of Legal Services and Electoral Studies of the Direcção Geral de Admin-
istração Interna 
Romania Respective regional authorities’ websites 
Sweden The unit for Democracy Statistics of Statistics Sweden 
Denmark The Danish statistical yearbook 2011 
Belgium The Information Centre of the Brussels Region, the Agentschap voor Binnenlands Bestuur, and 
the Union des Villes et Communes de Wallonie.    
Austria The Verbindungsstelle der Bundesländer and additional regional authorities 
Netherlands The Dutch Institute for Public Administration 
Poland The National Electoral commission 
Bulgaria The Central Election Commission of Bulgaria 
Greece The Ministry of Interior 
 
 
  
 Appendix 3.  The share of locally elected women in the European regions  
 
SE3 44.6 
SE1 44.4 
ES30 42.5 
ES21 42.4 
FR10 42 
DE3 41.9 
ES43 41.9 
ES23 41.6 
ES42 41.5 
BE1 41.5 
ES61 41.2 
SE2 40.9 
ES62 40.9 
ES53 40.7 
ES52 40.5 
ES22 40.4 
ES41 39.8 
FR82 39 
DE5 38.8 
DK01 38.6 
ES13 38.6 
ES12 38.2 
ES11 37.9 
ES24 37.9 
ES51 37.1 
FR51 37 
FR71 37 
FR52 37 
UKI 36.4 
BE2 
36.1 
AT13 35 
FR24 36 
FR53 36 
FR81 36 
FR61 35 
BE3 
34.9 
PT17 34.4 
FR63 34 
FR30 34 
FR23 34 
UKE 33.8 
FR72 33 
FR26 33 
DE7 33 
PT15 32.9 
PL61 32.8 
DE6 32.7 
FR25 32 
FR62 32 
PT20 31.7 
UKC 31.4 
DK04 31.2 
FR22 31 
FR42 31 
UKD 30.8 
PT30 30.8 
PT18 30.8 
UKK 30.7 
UKH 30.6 
DK02 30.5 
UKJ 30 
FR41 30 
PL51 29.7 
DEF 29.5 
CZ02 29.4 
HU2 29.2 
PL42 29.2 
FR83 29 
FR43 29 
FR21 29 
DEA 28.8 
HU3 28. 8 
PL62 28.7 
BG34 28.6 
DK03 28.5 
ITD5 28.2 
UKG 28.1 
PT16 27.7 
PL43 27.5 
CZ05 27.5 
CZ08 27.2 
NL1 27 
CZ07 26.6 
DEB 26.5 
AT12 26.2 
AT22 26.2 
PL11 26.2 
DK05 26 
DE4 26 
PL12 25.9 
PL63 25.8 
HU1 25.8 
NL3 25.7 
BG41 25.7 
BG31 25.6 
UKF 25.6 
PL52 25.6 
BG33 25.5 
DE2 25.2 
PL22 25 
DE8 24.8 
PT11 24.7 
NL2 24.4 
GR3 24.3 
BG32 24.3 
UKM 24.0 
CZ04 24 
ITD2 23.9 
ITC2 23.9 
ITE1 23.9 
CZ03 23.7 
SK03 23.6 
UKN 23.5 
UKL 23.5 
DEG 23.3 
CZ06 23.2 
ITC1 23.0 
SK02 22.8 
DE9 22.6 
ITE3 22.5 
ITC4 22.3 
CZ01 22.2 
PL41 22.1 
BG42 22.1 
ITG2 21.9 
PL21 21.8 
NL4 21.7 
AT21 21.6 
AT32 21.5 
ITE2 21.4 
PL33 21.2 
ITC3 21.0 
AT34 20.7 
SK04 20.5 
PL31 20.4 
PL34 20.3 
AT33 20.2 
ITD4 20.1 
DEC 20 
DEE 19.3 
AT11 19.3 
DED 19.2 
ITD3 19.1 
SK01 19.1 
AT31 18.9 
DE1 18.7 
RO31 18.5 
PL32 17.5 
RO22 16.8 
ITF1 16.0 
GR4 15.7 
ITF5 15.4 
ITF2 15.4 
RO41 15.2 
ITE4 14.8 
RO11 14.6 
GR1 13.9 
ITF6 13.1 
RO21 12.6 
ITG1 12.4 
GR2 12.3 
ITF4 12.3 
RO42 12.2 
RO32 10.7 
RO12 10.4 
ITF3 10.1 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
 
i
 In the introduction we referred to Kittilson’s (2006) finding that, for the advancement of women, it is important that the 
party organization has ties with organizations outside the party because these provide points of access for women. In 
our study we investigate the reverse situation, where there are few points of access.  
ii
 See Rigon and Tanzi’s (2012) study of Italy, and Wängnerud and Sundell’s (2010) and Svaleryd’s (2009) studies of 
Sweden for exceptions. 
iii
 We will discuss how we perform the same models for the dependent variable but with these cases excluded, and how 
this does not seem to alter our main findings significantly. 
iv
 In Belgium, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Netherlands, Sweden, and U.K., we study NUTS 1 regions. In Austria, Bul-
garia, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain, we study regions at 
the level of NUTS 2. 
v
 For a detailed description of the survey and the index, see Charron et al. (2013). For extensive sensitivity tests be-
tween national WGI scores and the regional measure of quality of government, see Charron (2010). 
vi
 An exception is Bolzano in Italy, as this region does not have local councilors as the other regions of Italy do. In our 
multivariate analysis we also “lose” four French territories as missing cases, as no data on educational attainment was 
available for these regions. 
vii
 Data is taken from the Electoral System Design database at http://www.idea.int/esd/ 
viii
 Retrieved from Eurostat at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/region_cities/   
ix
 Information retrieved from The Quota Project  http://www.quotaproject.org/uid/countryview  
x
 Information retrieved from The Quota Project http://www.quotaproject.org/uid/countryview  
xi
 The data was generously made available from the data used by Charron et al. (2013) and originated from the official 
figures reported to the Eurostat database. 
xii
 See www.freedomhouse.org/ and http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm  
 
 
